http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2008/04/who-can-i-be-now/ A blog from the Poetry Foundation where contemporary poets debate classic and contemporary poetry from America and around the world. Thu, 18 Mar 2010 16:46:37 -0500 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2008/04/who-can-i-be-now/#comment-3362 John Blackard Wed, 16 Apr 2008 18:09:44 +0000 http://pf/harriet/?p=785#comment-3362 Reginald, I just read your article "On Difficulty in Poetry" in the May/Summer issue of The Writer's Chronicle and wanted to thank you. Your "anatomy" or taxonomy will be very helpful the next time I get to teach a course in poetry. Near the end of the article you say, "I don't see poems as things I want to get over with, any more than I see life as something I want to get over with." I like that a lot, my friend. Best wishes-- John Blackard www.johnablackard.com Reginald,
I just read your article “On Difficulty in Poetry” in the May/Summer issue of The Writer’s Chronicle and wanted to thank you. Your “anatomy” or taxonomy will be very helpful the next time I get to teach a course in poetry.
Near the end of the article you say, “I don’t see poems as things I want to get over with, any more than I see life as something I want to get over with.” I like that a lot, my friend.
Best wishes–
John Blackard
http://www.johnablackard.com

]]> http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2008/04/who-can-i-be-now/#comment-3361 Michael Robbins Mon, 14 Apr 2008 16:40:19 +0000 http://pf/harriet/?p=785#comment-3361 Well, I thought Linh Dinh's original post missed the point a little. No one who's questioned the stability of the self - from Plutarch to Montaigne to Hume to Foucault - would deny that mental & bodily experience lends the impression of a coherent subject. On the contrary, the whole point is that it just <i>is</i> phenomenological continuity that provides the <i>illusion</i> of a persistent self. If it didn't <i>seem</i> to us - because of our memories & headaches - that we were the same, there would be no need to argue against our identity. For a terrific analytic defense of the thesis that "we cannot explain the unity of a person's life by claiming that the experiences in this life are all had by this person," see Derek Parfit's <i>Reasons and Persons</i>; for a doorstop overview of the problem, Jerrold Seigel's <i>The Idea of the Self</i> is pretty exhaustive. Best, mr Well, I thought Linh Dinh’s original post missed the point a little. No one who’s questioned the stability of the self – from Plutarch to Montaigne to Hume to Foucault – would deny that mental & bodily experience lends the impression of a coherent subject. On the contrary, the whole point is that it just is phenomenological continuity that provides the illusion of a persistent self. If it didn’t seem to us – because of our memories & headaches – that we were the same, there would be no need to argue against our identity. For a terrific analytic defense of the thesis that “we cannot explain the unity of a person’s life by claiming that the experiences in this life are all had by this person,” see Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons; for a doorstop overview of the problem, Jerrold Seigel’s The Idea of the Self is pretty exhaustive.
Best,
mr

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